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Chart 1:
M2 • Actual and its Target Range
When economic activity slowed over the early
part of this year, many worried that the u.s.
economy was about to enter a recession. One of
the factors contributing to this concern was the
sluggish growth of the monetary aggregates,
especially M2. From the fourth quarter of 1988 to
June 1989, M2 grew at less than a two percent
annual rate. Consequently, as Chart 1 shows, the
level of M2 over the first half of this year was
significantly below the levels established by the
three to seven percent target growth range. How-
ever, M2 has grown at an annual average rate of
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This Letter examines the recent behavior of M2
to determine why the aggregate grew at such a
slow rate over the first half of the year. Moreover,
given the prevailing uncertainty about M2 in the
wake of recent changes in the financial environ-
ment, this article discusses whether short-term
movements in M2 generally can tell us anything
about the direction of economic activity over and
above what we can more easily infer from move-
ments in other key macroeconomic variables.
Why the slowdown?
Many argued earlier this year that M2's departure
from its target range was a signal that the Federal
Reserve needed to ease monetary policy to avoid
a recession. However, financial innovation and
J
deregulation have made it difficult to interpret
short-term movements in M2. For instance, M2
now is more sensitive to interest rate movements
(in the short run), so that a given change in open
market interest rates can lead to a surprisingly
large change in M2. Thus, before attaching pol-
icy significance to M2's departure from its target
range earlier this year, we need to understand
the cause of the slowdown.
To determine why M2 was below target, it is
important first to determine whether the behavior
of M2 in 1989 has been consistent with the
aggregate's historical relationship to key macrO-
economic variables such as income, prices, and
interest rates. Behavior consistent with this rela-
tionship means simply that movements in M2
will provide no information about the direction of
the economy apart from that which also is con-
tained in past and current values of the other key
macroeconomic variables.
Below-target growth in M2, by itself, cannot tell
us whether a slowdown in economic activity is
imminent. Additional information is needed. In
this case, forecasts from econometric models of
the economy will provide more accurate and
reliable information than will movements in M2
alone,because these models incorporate more
data and underlying economic relationships.
Thus, when M2's behavior is "normal," move-
ments in M2, by themselves, are not sufficient
to predict future activity.
By contrast, growth of M2 that is out of line
with this aggregate's historical relationship with
income, prices, and interest rates suggests that
movements in M2 may be providing signals
about future movements in income and prices
that are not yet directly discernible from these
variables. Whether this is the case, however,
depends on the origins of M2's unusual behavior.
"Shocks" to the money supply (such as a
tightening of monetary policy) can cause M2 to
behave in an unusual manner if, as some econo-
mists claim, individuals do not immediately
adjust their real (that is, price-level adjusted)FRBSF
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band encompasses a range of plus or minus two
standard errors around this forecast, implying
that unless the nature of the disturbances has
changed, there is only a 5% chance that M2











This explanation suggests that the M2 slowdown
during April and May was temporary in nature. It
is also consistent with the subsequent rapid
growth in M2, since it is reasonable to expect
individuals to replenish depleted balances.
Chart 2 shows that although M2 growth was less
than predicted over the first four months of this
year, the deviation was within the error band. In
contrast, May's negative growth rate can be con-
sidered unusual. Over the last four months, M2
growth has moved back into the two-standard-
error range, with the July growth rate in the
upper half of the range.
Tax payments and unusual growth
The decline in M2 during May represents statis-
tically unusual behavior, but it also appears to
have been the result of a temporary disturbance
to the public's demand for M2. One plausible
explanation for this behavior is that individuals
were faced with unexpectedly large tax obliga-
tions this year, and were forced temporarily to
draw down money balances held in M2 to meet
these obligations. Reports from the u.s. Treasury
are consistent with this interpretation. For
example, revenues during April were substan-
tially higher than projected, even though
projections for 1989 were above last year's levels.
Individuals paid $68.5 billion in April 1989,
compared with $53.3 billion in April 1988.
One such equation is the M2 demand equation
containedin the San Francisco Money Market
Model. The specification used in this model
assumes that there isa long-run, equilibrium
relationship between the level of M2 and the
levels of income, interest rates, and prices, but
that short-run disturbances can affect the growth
rate of.the aggregate, temporarily driving M2
away from its equilibrium value. These devia-
tions, or "errors;' between actual and equilib-
rium values of M2 are eliminated over time in
this "error-correction" specification.
This equation was used to predict the rate of
money growth over the period from the fourth
quarter of 1988 to September 1989, given the
actual values of income, prices,and interest rates
observed during this period. Chart 2 compares
these predicted growth rates with the actual
values. If the range of disturbances to M2 over
the forecast horizon had been the same as itwas
in the past,actual M2 growth should lie within
the error band depicted in the chart. The error
money balances in response to such a shock. In
that case, a change in the money supply initially
would have no effect on other macroeconomic
variables. Gradually, however, individuals would
adjust their moneyholdings to the levels they .
desire, and this adjustment process would have
an effect on income, prices, and interest rates. In
this case, a slowdown in money growth would
signal a slowdown in economic activity which
policy makers should offset to prevent a con-
traction in the economy's output.
The other possibility is that the observed slow-
down in M2 was the resuIt of a decline in the
public's willingness to hold money balances. In
this case, slower M2 growth reflects the public's
preferences, and no adjustments in income,
prices, and interest rates will take place. As a
result, policy makers would be correct in choos-
ing not to respond to below-target growth in M2.
Unusual growth?
One way to determine which of these factors was
responsible for slow M2 growth over the first half
of this year is to compare actual M2 with pre-
dicted values obtained from an estimated money
demand equation. Any supply and/or demand
shocks should show up as a departure of actual
M2 growth from the predicted values.Chart 3:
Level of M2
One-time disturbance
Has the growth since May been sufficient to off-
set the effects of the unusually low growth in that
month? The answer is provided in Chart 3, which
plots the actual and predicted levels of M2 and
the corresponding standard error band. The
chart shows that the level of M2 fell below the
two-standard-error band in May, and that it has
remained below the band through September.
At first glance, this observation seems to suggest
that M2 has continued to behave erratically.
However, the estimated equation in the Money
Market model suggests that less than 10% of any
gap between actual and predicted M2 typically
is eliminated each month. So it will be a while
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*Band represents two standard errors.
Since M2's behavior in May appears to be the
result of special factors during the month, a
second simulation of the model was run that
included M2 growth through May. This simula-
tion suggests that actual M2 growth over the June
to September period was close to what we would
expect, given that there had been an unusually
large shock to M2 in May. Although we clearly
do not have enough data to make a firm judg-
ment, this outcome is at least consistent with the
interpretation that the behavior of M2 since the
fourth quarter of 1988 is not fundamentally out of
line with what past experience would suggest.
M2 and monetary policy
Since there appears to be little evidence of
unusual behavior prior to May, should we
interpret the slow growth in M2 over the early
part of this year as a signal of a coming slow-
down in economic activity? As discussed above,
in the absence of any money-demand or -supply
shocks, any standard model of the economy can
be used to predict economic activity more relia-
bly than can M2 alone. Forecasts obtained from
different macro models used by this Bank did not
suggest that a recession was imminent.
What then should one make of the below-target
level of M2 over the first half of this year? While
it is possible that M2's behavior may have been
signalling that economic conditions over this
period were different from what was expected
when the ranges were first formulated, it is also
useful to keep in mind that in the early part of
the year M2's target range is relatively narrow,
narrower even than the two-standard-error band
shown in Chart 3. Thus, M2 may have fallen out-
side the target range early in the year largely as a
result of random, but not unusual, movements at
a time when the target range was relatively
narrow.
Finally, what does this episode tell us about
the significance of short-run movements in M2
generally? Because it has occurred in an environ-
ment in which recent financial innovations and
deregulation already have made it difficult to
interpret movements in all of the monetary aggre-
gates, it suggests that we need to be extremely
cautious in attaching policy significanceto such
short-run movements. This is not to say that all
movements in M2 are unrelated to economic
activity. On the contrary, there appears to be a
stable long-run relationship between M2 and
income, prices, and interest rates. Analysts are
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